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Preface
The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which
have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The
encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of
spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, addi-
tional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository.
Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental moni-
toring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the
repository site.
The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland
within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision
made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluo-
to site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an
underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation
of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of
the final repository.
The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first
safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the
excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regula-
tory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert
group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical
safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation
of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports
produced by this group. The first of these “NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of
disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal”
describes the new safeguards concerns for spent nuclear fuel. The three others “Use of
satellite and airborne remote sensing in the safeguards of a nuclear waste repository”,
“Environmental sampling in monitoring spent fuel repository” and “Seismic monitoring of
rock excavations, baseline at Olkiluoto nuclear waste repository site” propose new safe-
guards approaches to be applied at the Olkiluoto repository site.
OKKO Olli (ed.). Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the
Olkiluoto site. STUK-YTO-TR 199. Helsinki 2003. 3 pp + 16 pp + 17 pp + 10 pp + 13 pp.
Keywords: safeguards, spent nuclear fuel disposal, remote sensing, seismic,
environmental monitoring
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The report reviews into technologies available for the NDA verification of the spent fuel
assemblies and canisters applicable in the disposal of spent fuel.  Needs for technological
development are identified. The monitoring needs, and available and prospective technol-
ogies are discussed, taking into account of possibility to use process performance assess-
ment and quality assurance data as well as radiation safety monitoring data also for
safeguards purposes. Some aspects of the safeguards and safety interaction are briefly
discussed.
Abstract
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After the decision made in 2001 to site the final
repository of the spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluo-
to site in Eurajoki the final disposal programme
in Finland has become site-specific. The next
phase contains building of an underground facili-
ty, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation and
site confirmation studies. If found suitable,
ONKALO may form a part of the final repository.
The construction of ONKALO is scheduled to start
in 2004. [1] This signifies that the first safeguards
measures, e.g. base level mapping of the site area,
need to take place as early as 2003. Safeguards
requirements need to be specified on the level in-
fluencing the facility design for proceeding with
designing of the final disposal facility and for
starting of the pre-operational phase by construct-
ing the ONKALO facility. [2]
To support the development and implementa-
tion of the regulatory control of the final disposal
programme, STUK has established an independ-
ent expert group, LOSKA, in April 2002. The
group should support the STUK in the develop-
ment of the technical safeguards requirements, in
the implementation of the safeguards and in the
evaluation of the plans of the facility operator.
Additionally the group may assist the STUK in
defining R&D needs related to the safeguards of
the final disposal.
The target of the NDA or monitoring in this
report is the spent fuel itself. Therefore this report
deals with the operational phase only, as spent
fuel is handled only during this phase in the final
disposal facility. On the other hand, the report
considers the whole process of the final disposal
starting from the interim storage through the
encapsulation plant down to the underground
final repository.
This report reviews into the present status of
the NDA technology, which may be useful in the
verification measures of the spent fuel subject to
final disposal. Also the monitoring technology
applicable to the final disposal facility is re-
viewed. Furthermore, it briefly discusses the safe-
ty aspects of the safeguards measures during the
final disposal. The needs for technological R&D on
these disciplines will be identified and discussed.
The safeguards approach of a model repository as
drafted in the report of the SAGOR task is used as
a reference. [3]
1 Introduction
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2.1 Needs and available techniques
for NDA
There are two kinds of needs for verification meas-
urements of spent fuel assemblies subjected to fi-
nal disposal:
1. It must be verified that the residual heat
generation rate does not exceed the accepted
level;
2. It must be verified that the nuclear material
content of the spent fuel is as declared.
Temperature is an important parameter influenc-
ing on the performance of the bentonite buffer
material around the spent fuel canister in its dis-
posal location. Therefore it is of utmost impor-
tance to limit the surface temperature of the can-
ister. The surface temperature depends on the
heat generation rate of the residual activity of the
fuel assemblies and on the thermal conductivity of
the near-field environment of the canister. [4] As
the total heat generation of each disposal canister
is limited, one must make sure that the residual
heat generation of each assembly is known with
sufficient reliability. The residual power can be
verified e.g. by measuring the gamma emission
rate or the activity of 137Cs. These NDA verifica-
tion measurements can be automated and per-
formed quite rapidly. The radiometric measure-
ments should be calibrated calorimetrically for a
set of reference assemblies. [5]
There are no specific IAEA safeguards criteria
yet available for the spent fuel subject to final
disposal. The closest analogue having the safe-
guards criteria is the spent fuel designated for
difficult-to-access. According to the IAEA safe-
guards criteria [6], the fuel prior to its becoming
difficult-to-access must be subjected to item count-
ing, item identification and NDA that provides a
high detection probability for gross and partial
defects. For the fuel designated for final disposal
the verification should fulfil at least those re-
quirements set forth for the fuel designated for
difficult-to-access.
The Finnish national safeguards requirements
for the final disposal cannot be less stringent than
the IAEA and Euratom requirements. Discussion
has been started on the requirement of a partial
defect level verification of each fuel item designat-
ed for final disposal. In some contexts the require-
ment of a pin-level verification has been men-
tioned for those fuel items, whose design enables
dismantling in the NPP. [7]
Spent fuel measurement systems able to meas-
ure the neutron and gross gamma emission pro-
files are commercially available. [8]
Technology capable for pin-level verification,
based on gamma emission tomography, is under
active development and some major break-
throughs have been achieved. It has been shown,
both by simulation and experimentally, that a
BWR fuel assembly can be verified at the pin
level. [9, 10] This should apply also to a VVER-440
assembly, which has comparable cross sectional
dimensions, although experimental evidence on
that is missing so far. For a PWR assembly with a
larger cross section, in order to achieve a pin level
verification in all cases, still some improvement is
needed. [11]
2.2 Research and development needs
Should the requirement for pin-level verification
be adopted, the technique and equipment availa-
ble would not yet be mature for direct application
of the gamma emission tomography. Gamma emis-
sion tomography systems applicable for verifica-
tion of spent fuel are not yet commercially availa-
ble. The following technological development
needs can be identified: [11]
1. improvement of the signal quality;
2. better mechanical accuracy;
2 NDA applicable for verification of
spent fuel assemblies
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3. development of signal analysis to distinguish
fuel assemblies of “advanced technology” like
those containing rods of partial-length and
rods with burnable absorber;
4. automation in the interpretation of the meas-
urement results.
The high signal quality is fundamental. The de-
tector detects four different kinds of gamma quan-
ta as depicted schematically in Figure 1. Only the
quanta of type 1 in Figure 1 contribute to the
signal. The parasitic contributions can be reduced
by different improvements. The crosstalk through
the collimator, quanta of type 2 in Figure 1, can-
not be eliminated by energy-dispersive counting
systems (low-level discrimination or multi-chan-
nel pulse-height analysis). In a multidetector sys-
tem the collimator thickness is limited by the dis-
tance between the detectors. Type 3 and 4 quanta
can be best discriminated by pulse-height analy-
sis. This requires a detector with high full-peak
efficiency and high resolution. A perfect detector
fulfilling all requirements has not yet been found,
and the best detectors so far tested are far from
perfect.
One prototype gamma emission tomography
device capable for fast data collection has been
built and demonstrated. [12] This prototype was
optimised for high-efficiency data collection of the
high-energy gamma radiation from 140Ba/La. This
nuclide can be used for the non-destructive deter-
mination of the power distribution during the
irradiation period preceding the evacuation of the
assembly. The prototype device demonstrated that
it should be possible to implement a gamma
emission tomography device capable for mapping
of the fuel assembly cross section in 20 minutes on
one axial level.
The mechanical precision so far achieved in the
prototype devices requires further improvement.
The most difficult problem is to define the position
of the fuel assembly relative to the detector/
collimator system accurately enough. It should be
able to take into account possible deformations of
the fuel assemblies during irradiation. A laser-
optical measurement system could possibly be
able to measure the actual position of the fuel
assembly with sufficient precision.
If the technical problems described above can
be solved, the signal quality could provide good
opportunities for a reliable unfolding of the meas-
ured data to produce a map of fuel pins. The next
step would be the development of an automatic
system for evaluation of the resulted map and for
comparison with the operator’s data. This system
should be matched with the requirements of the
disposal process allowing its smooth integration
into the process. A demand of high detection
probability of all irregularities and very low or
zero probability of false alarms should be fulfilled.
Figure 1. Main types of gamma rays seen by the
detector in gamma emission tomography. See text
for explanation.
Detector
Collimator
Fuel assembly
1
2
3
4
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3.1 Available techniques
If an unbreakable continuity of knowledge can be
achieved by multiple independent C/S and by col-
lection into a data bank of all process control data
of the encapsulation and disposal process, there
should be no need for verification of the nuclear
material content of a closed and sealed disposal
canister.
However, a provision should be made, should
any need arise, to verify that all fuel assemblies
are present in a closed disposal canister, as de-
clared. The following techniques might be applica-
ble:
1. measurement of the gross weight of the canis-
ter;
2. verification of the presence of the number of
highly radioactive items corresponding to the
number of fuel assemblies declared;
3. to measure a radiation signal corresponding to
the expected yield of the fuel assemblies in the
canister.
In the first case a load cell could be used for veri-
fying the total mass of the sealed disposal canis-
ter. The accuracy of the mass measurement should
be well below half of the weight of one fuel assem-
bly, i.e. below 100 kg. In order to reach this goal
the tare of individual empty canisters should be
equal within tens of kilograms. If the variation of
the canister masses exceeds this limit the tare of
each canister should be measured before inserting
the assemblies.
The second measurement would give an inde-
pendent verification of the presence of the number
of fuel assemblies as declared. The only conceiva-
ble measurement method, which could be able to
verify the presence of all twelve assemblies, would
be a collimated gamma-ray measurement above
the top of the lid of the canister. An SFAT-like
device could scan over all assembly positions to
detect the number and position of the radiation
maxima corresponding to the declared loading
pattern of the canister. It is highly improbable
that any specific attribute, e.g. the photo peak of
137Cs, could be detectable through the heavy lid
structures of the canister.
In the third technique the measurement of
either gamma or neutron radiation through the
sidewall of the canister could be considered. The
problem of radiation measurement around side of
a canister or cask has been studied recently under
MSSP Tasks to the IAEA safeguards. [13] It was
concluded that in a removal scenario the change
of the gamma radiation level was so small that
even a peripheral assembly could be removed
without being detected. A replacement could be
used to compensate for the weight change. The
replacement of the outer assemblies with dum-
mies would certainly be detected, but the central
assemblies could be replaced without being de-
tected due to their small contribution to the gam-
ma signal.
Recently measurement of passive neutron
emission distribution of CASTOR casks has been
attempted for verification of the presence of the
declared number of fuel assemblies. [13] Promis-
ing results have been achieved. It could be as-
sumed that the weaker shielding and the lower
amount of fuel assemblies in the final disposal
canister as compared to the CASTOR cask should
have a favourable influence to this kind of meas-
urement. If the neutron emission of individual
fuel assemblies could be reliably correlated with
the azimuthal neutron flux distribution of a load-
ed canister, this method could be developed for
verification of the contents of a sealed canister.
3 NDA applicable for verification of
disposal canisters
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This would make it important to measure the
total neutron emission of each assembly before
inserting into the canister. This measurement
could be easily integrated in the assembly verifi-
cation measurement system considered in Section
2. The capability of neutron distribution measure-
ment as a verification method for the disposal
canister should deserve further study.
3.2 Research and development needs
Should a verification option of a sealed disposal
canister be considered necessary, the feasibility of
those radiation-based NDA verification approach-
es considered in Section 3.1 should be studied,
and a method and a device based on that method
should be developed and established before start-
ing the encapsulation and disposal activities.
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A due control of the encapsulation and disposal
process would require comprehensive monitoring
and data collection of all material streams in-
volved. This data would serve the performance
confirmation and quality assurance. A properly
designed and implemented monitoring system
could simultaneously serve the collection of data
for safeguards purposes. The monitoring activities
in the point of view of safety and performance
confirmation of the disposal as well as in the point
of view of safeguards have been considered in var-
ious consultants meetings and advisory group
meetings of the IAEA. [14, 15] The interaction
between safety and safeguards measures, espe-
cially monitoring, was first dealt with in Septem-
ber 2002 in an expert group meeting in Oskars-
hamn Sweden. [15]
One can distinguish three different kinds of
material streams in the encapsulation and dispos-
al process:
1. the main stream of the spent fuel;
2. complementary material streams;
3. back streams.
4.1 Main stream of spent fuel
Spent fuel should be present only in the main
stream. In the encapsulation plant and in the re-
pository this stream comprises the following ac-
tivities:
1. receipt of a full transport cask;
2. verification of the integrity of the cask and the
seals;
3. temporary storage of transport casks;
4. transfer of the cask into hot cell;
5. removal of seals and opening the lid;
6. transfer of the fuel assemblies from the cask
into the disposal canister;
7. closing and sealing the disposal canister;
8. temporary storage of the canisters ready for
disposal;
9. transfer of the disposal canister into the repos-
itory;
10.transfer of the canister to its disposal location
in the repository;
11.emplacement of the canister into the disposal
hole; and
12.filling the disposal hole with bentonite blocks.
According to the present plans the disposal hole
will be filled with bentonite blocks almost imme-
diately after the emplacement of the canister. The
bentonite layer above the canisters will be about 2
metres. This signifies that after the emplacement
all monitoring activities based on the radiation
emitted by the canisters are impossible.
In the main stream there should be gates able
to record automatically the passing of the cask or
disposal canister through the gate. The following
parameters should be registered when applicable:
• ID number of the item,
• seals,
• radiation,
• mass of the item.
The technology for monitoring and recording these
parameters is readily available.
4.2 Complementary material streams
The following complementary material streams in
the disposal process can be identified:
1. receipt of empty disposal canisters and their
transfer into the hot cell;
2. fabrication of the bentonite filling blocks and
the lids of the disposal holes and their transfer
into the repository;
3. empty waste drums for the radioactive waste
produced in the process;
4. spare parts and materials needed for repair
and maintenance of the equipment and sys-
tems.
4 Monitoring of encapsulation and
disposal process
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It is theoretically conceivable that radioactive ma-
terial could be used to conceal a diversion of spent
fuel. Therefore it must be ensured that no radioac-
tive material can be smuggled into the encapsula-
tion facility or repository along with these non-
radioactive material streams. This calls for record-
able radiation monitoring of all material batches
at their entry points.
4.3 Back streams
The material streams out of the encapsulation and
disposal plants are here called back streams. They
are:
1. empty disposal casks sent back to the interim
storage; and
2. waste packages, either radioactive or inactive,
brought out of the controlled area.
The empty disposal casks should be visually in-
spected before closing the lid. Additionally, before
departing the facility they should be weighed and
inspected for radiation.
The waste packages should be monitored for
gamma radiation. An additional neutron meas-
urement using passive and/or active interrogation
should ensure that no fissile material is trans-
ported out of the facility among the waste.
The technology for monitoring the complemen-
tary material streams and back streams of the
disposal process is readily available.
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Special attention should be paid on ensuring that
the access points to the repository are well in con-
trol. All traffic between the ground level and the
underground repository must take place through
these strategic points. In this section reference is
made to the model repository as described in Ref.
[3]. The plans of the Finnish disposal facility, as
described in Ref. [16], are based on this the model
repository concept.
The access points to the repository can be
subdivided into three groups:
1. access points with no traffic;
2. access points with traffic of construction activi-
ties and
3. access points with traffic of disposal activities.
In the model repository these three different kinds
of access points are physically separated.
5.1 Technical shafts
The technical shafts intended for providing elec-
tricity and water supplies and ventilation repre-
sent the first kind of access points. Normally they
are closed and locked preventing the entrance of
man or material through this route. Human pres-
ence is necessary only for maintenance and repair
purposes. These actions should be recorded in the
surveillance data bank. Radiation monitoring and
motion sensors can be used. The motion sensors
may be used to trigger recording surveillance vid-
eo cameras covering the area. All events, e.g. unu-
sual radiation levels or triggering of a motion sen-
sor should be recorded. These data should be com-
pared with the records of the declared mainte-
nance and repair activities.
5.2 Entry point of construction activity
During the operational phase of the repository
there will be concurrently construction and dis-
posal activities going on. In the model repository
described in Ref. [3] the entrances for these two
activities are on the opposite ends of the disposal
facility. A system of main tunnels connecting these
ends is excavated between these two ends. The
disposal activity starts from the end of the dispos-
al shaft. Concurrently new disposal vaults are ex-
cavated along one main tunnel and this activity
proceeds towards the construction shaft. The dis-
posal activity proceeds behind the construction as
new disposal vaults are completed. The construc-
tion activity and disposal activity are separated
by a wall, which is transferred along with the
progress of the work. In this concept no radioac-
tive material should be transferred through the
construction entry point. The entry point should
be equipped with a radiation measurement gate
able to monitor the vehicles entering or exiting
the repository. This kind of technology is routinely
in use for radioactivity and nuclear material con-
trol at the frontier crossing points and at the sea-
ports.
For supporting activity to the design informa-
tion verification it could be useful to automatical-
ly measure and record the masses of the vehicles
crossing the entry point. This data could be used
to keep record of the total rock mass excavated
and transported out of the facility.
5.3 Canister shaft and disposal activity
The systems and functions described in this sec-
tion cover the monitoring of items 9–12 in the list
of activities belonging to the main stream of the
spent fuel in Section 4.1.
At the upper station of the canister shaft there
should be a gate as described in 4.1 recording
automatically the ID number, the seals and the
mass of the canister, and the radiation level emit-
ted. Neutron-measurement systems should also
be considered in this gate.
The second gate could be installed close to the
5 Monitoring of access points to repository
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lower station of the canister shaft at the entrance
of the tunnel system. The canister transport vehi-
cle could be measured when entering the tunnel
and when returning after emplacement of the
canister. The mass difference and the difference in
the radiation level as measured by the gate could
give further confidence that the canister has been
transferred in the repository. These checkpoints
could also be used to ensure that no radioactive
material is transferred out of the repository
through this route.
The bentonite block transfers down to the
repository should also be registered by the control
gates. In this case the registration of the radiation
level would add to the confidence that no radioac-
tive items are transferred mixed with the ben-
tonite blocks.
Both these checkpoints should be equipped
with recording surveillance video systems to en-
sure that no tampering of these measurement
gates is attempted.
Should there be a need for recording the em-
placement of the canister into the emplacement
hole, the monitoring instruments for this purpose
could be installed in the canister transport vehi-
cle. The data gained during the emplacement
could be transferred from the records residing in
the transport vehicle into the safeguards data
bank as the vehicle has returned from the em-
placement trip. Correspondingly the filling of the
emplacement hole with bentonite blocks after
emplacement of the disposal canister could be
recorded using the monitoring instruments in-
stalled in the bentonite transport vehicle.
The technology required to implement moni-
toring of the access points to the repository as well
as recording the material passing through the
control gate is readily available.
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6.1 Intrusive instrumentation
Nuclear material control and safeguards meas-
ures that compromise safety cannot be accepted.
An important principle of the final disposal is that
it shall isolate the spent fuel from the biosphere
for as long as the material disposed of is consid-
ered as being dangerous to the biosphere. This
isolation cannot be compromised by any intrusive
safeguards measure. This requirement excludes
the placement of any instrumentation in the em-
placement hole or emplacement vault before back-
filling.
6.2 Dual use of safety monitoring
instrumentation and NDA
The monitoring used for the radiological surveil-
lance of the rooms of the radiation controlled zone
can, and should, be used also for tracking of the
6 Safeguards-safety interaction
route of the spent fuel in the encapsulation plant
and in the repository. All significant changes of
radiation levels should be attributed to certain
cask/fuel/canister transfers. Therefore these
events should be automatically recorded together
with their time stamps.
The safeguards use of monitoring instrumenta-
tion may require authentication of the primary
signal. The problem of signal authentication in
dual-use systems shall be solved reliably in such
cases. The same applies to the dual-use NDA
measurement systems. Especially the problem of
the maintenance and repair of the dual use in-
strumentation must be arranged so that it does
not hamper the normal disposal process, but yet
the authenticity of the signals is guaranteed to
the satisfaction of the safeguards authorities.
A-14
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 9 9 NDA VERIFICATION OF SPENT FUEL, MONITORING OF DISPOSAL CANISTERS…
It is highly probable that the requirement of par-
tial defect verification of each fuel item subject to
final disposal will be assumed. The target level of
partial defect, which will be required, will depend
on the future progress of the NDA verification
technology. The authorities may assume a target
level, e.g. single pin level of verification, which
cannot be met at the moment but which seems to
be achievable with a reasonable technological de-
velopment effort. At the moment the high-energy
gamma emission tomography seems most promis-
ing method for this verification target.
Simultaneously with the tomography, a gam-
ma spectrometric scanning could be applied to
ensure the fulfilment of the residual power gener-
ation limit of each assembly. The neutron emis-
sion measurement of each assembly may serve in
facilitating the verification of a sealed disposal
canister if seen necessary. This method needs
7 Summary
additional development efforts before it can be
considered as operational.
The technologies needed to implement a com-
prehensive monitoring programme are readily
available. This monitoring programme should be
accomplished in such a way that it could simulta-
neously serve both the safety/process control/qual-
ity assurance and the safeguards functions.
Integrated unattended systems containing
monitoring and NDA functions have been imple-
mented both for the IAEA and for the Euratom
safeguards. [17, 18] They are based on modular
design letting relatively easy implementation of
facility-specific systems. Remote transmission of
the data and system diagnostic information from
the facility to the safeguards headquarters (IAEA
or Euratom) has also been implemented success-
fully.
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USE OF SATELLITE AND AIRBORNE REMOTE
SENSING IN THE SAFEGUARDS OF A
NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY SITE
Tuomas Häme
VTT Information Technology
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The potential of space-borne earth observation techniques to monitor possible undeclared
activities on a nuclear waste repository site was surveyed. The highest potential of earth
observation is in the detection of undeclared construction of buildings and roads as well
as detection of undeclared quarrying. Real-time applications such as continuous traffic
monitoring are not feasible in earth observation applications that require high spatial
accuracy. The monitoring system consists of baseline data acquisition that should be done
before excavation activities start, of routine monitoring, and of an optional alarm survey.
Space-borne synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is suggested as the principal instrument to
collect the monitoring data because of its all-weather capability.
Abstract
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Earth observation techniques are one tool to pre-
vent illegal use of nuclear waste that has been
stored or is being stored in a final repository. This
survey discusses benefits and limitations of space-
borne and airborne remote sensing in the moni-
toring of a final disposal facility site. Also, an out-
line of a monitoring system is presented and its
costs are roughly estimated. A special focus is on
the Olkiluoto site, which will be the final disposal
site for the spent nuclear fuel in Finland. The
report does not discuss how earth observation can
be used to locate nuclear plants or how their oper-
ation purpose and operative status are defined.
The publications that deal with earth observation
and safeguards usually discuss just those topics
and are not fully relevant to this survey (Potential
Applications of Commercial… 1999, Andersson
2000, Jasani et al. 2000).
A final disposal facility is controlled by the
IAEA (The International Atomic Energy Agency),
as well as by the facility operators, site owners,
and by the national authorities. It shall be over-
seen that the local actors do not commit any
unannounced or illegal activities and that the
repository site is maintained according to the
internationally agreed standards. Since the period
of decay of plutonium, the raw material of nuclear
weapons is 24 400 years the spent fuel is princi-
pally usable for illegal purposes indefinitely.
Therefore the repository site should also be moni-
tored continuously over an indefinite time period.
A final disposal facility could be subject to
short-term criminal actions when the repository is
being filled. After closure the site monitoring
should continue to avoid stealing of the spent fuel
through tunnels that may have been illegally
quarried. It has to be taken into consideration
how long it takes to commit a certain type crimi-
nal activity when the monitoring methods using
earth observation are planned.
Since spent fuel is highly radioactive its trans-
portation requires specific transportation equip-
ment to protect the driver and other transporta-
tion personnel. Even though one nuclear fuel
assembly weights only 200 to 300 kilograms the
total weight of the canister, transportation cask,
and the vehicle itself is in the magnitude class of
100 tons. Removal of a whole fuel assembly from
the cask during the period when the repository is
being filled is technically rather straightforward
but should be easy to detect with conventional
safeguards procedures except in the case when all
local actors are involved in the criminal activities
(Moran, B. W. and Meer van der, K. 1997). Because
of the high radioactivity of the fuel, which makes
its transportation difficult it is most likely that
the removed fuel would be processed close to the
power plant or the repository facilities. However,
long distance transportation should also be taken
into consideration particularly when the power
plant is by the sea.
It is also possible that not the whole assembly
but individual fuel pins are stolen from the assem-
blies and replaced by dummy material. This alter-
native is technically more difficult to accomplish
but harder to detect.
Removal of spent fuel from the closed repository
through tunneling would certainly require long
time period and heavy equipment. Present TBM
(Tunnel Boring Method) techniques can make
during the day some 20 meters of tunnel large
enough for a truck if the rock type is soft. With
Finnish rocks the speed is much lower. The short-
est possible time to make a tunnel of 500 meters
would thus be two to three weeks. In practice the
quarrying would be likely done relatively slowly
and the tunneling would be started from a dis-
tance to the repository to keep it better secret.
Moreover, the total length of a sloping access
tunnel might be of the order of 5–10 km. The
1 Requirements to the safeguards
USE OF SATELLITE AND AIRBORNE REMOTE SENSING IN THE SAFEGUARDS… S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 9 9
B-5
tunnel quarrying could already be started when
the excavation activities for the official repository
tunnels are ongoing because this could make
diversion easier. The area to be monitored should
be relatively large when quarrying activities are
concerned.
Table I shows that earth observation has a
particularly high potential to detect undeclared
activities that require construction of buildings,
roads and tunnels. Even though it is impossible to
penetrate inside the ground using common remote
sensing techniques appearance of a tunnel open-
ing can be detected and particularly accumulation
of the quarry waste could be monitored. A reason-
ably low observation frequency (i.e. approximately
one month) should be adequate.
The potential to detect undeclared activities is
somewhat lower when the fuel is stolen during
the filling period of the repository and transported
from the site. The lower potential comes particu-
larly from the high requirement to the time fre-
quency for the observations and from the high
requirement to the spatial resolution. Daily or
even more frequent observations using airborne
or space-borne techniques would be very costly to
accomplish. After the alarm on possible unde-
clared activities from other sources earth observa-
tion can be utilized to obtain information on them.
Table I. Scenarios to remove spent fuel from the declared processing chain, relevant subjects to be
monitored using earth observation and required observation frequency.
Scenario What should be monitored 
Longest safe 
observation 
frequency
Potential 
of earth 
observation*
Stealing of fuel assembly 
from the cask, refinery on 
site
Undeclared buildings, traffic, 
roads 
1 month 5
Stealing of fuel assembly 
from the cask, transporta-
tion from the site
Traffic, undeclared roads 1 day (in practice 
after alarm)
4
Stealing of fuel pins from 
assemblies (use on site or 
transportation from site)
Undeclared buildings, traffic, 
undeclared roads
1 day (in practice 
after alarm)
3
Quarrying a tunnel to steal 
fuel from the repository 
(post closure)
Quarrying sites in the surround-
ings of the repository, undeclared 
roads, land and sea traffic
1 month 5
* From highest to lowest: 5…1 (0 would be non-existing)
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2.1 Baseline
The proposed monitoring system of the disposal
facilities at the repository site has three principal
elements: 1) Baseline, 2) Routine monitoring, and
3) Alarm survey (Figure 1).
The baseline survey should be done before
starting the excavation activities of the repository.
The baseline database consists of a digital map
that is provided by the operator of the disposal
site. The database includes all buildings, roads
and other constructions. It also includes optical
imagery with a spatial resolution of some tens of
centimeters and an accurate digital elevation
model (Table II).
The optical imagery should be acquired specifi-
cally from an airborne digital imaging campaign.
Stereoscopic imagery can be used to compute the
digital elevation model if it is not already availa-
ble earlier. Another option is to collect an accurate
3D data set through an airborne laser scanning.
All data are stored in a GIS (Geographic Informa-
tion System). The maps, the imagery, and the
elevation model are also used to generate a three-
dimensional model of the environment that can be
viewed from any direction (Figure 2). The detailed
model should be prepared from the repository site
(i.e. the fenced area). A similar but somewhat less
detailed model should be computed from the sur-
roundings of the repository, approximately five
kilometers to all directions from the repository.
In addition to the specifically collected air-
borne data, imagery from the same or similar
instruments that are used to do the regular moni-
toring has to be stored into the database. This
imagery (marked with sparse raster in Figure 1)
has a coarser spatial resolution than the imagery
2 Earth observation based monitoring system
Figure 1. Phases of an earth observation based monitoring system of a repository.
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Data
Ground 
resolution (m) Source
Repository site
Building, road and other construction map, 
digital
0.2–0.4 Repository site operator
Airborne color imagery, digital 0.4 Specific imaging action
Airborne profiling scanning 0.1 Specific imaging action (optional 
to make a very detailed elevation 
model)
Elevation model, digital 0.5 From site operator or from 
airborne imagery
3D model with map and  image data 0.5 Computed using the high-
resolution data
Five-kilometer radius from the repository site edge
Building, road and other construction map, 
digital
2 National Board of Survey
Elevation model, digital 2 National Board of Survey
Ikonos, QuickBird, Spot 5 or similar imagery 
(preferably from winter, spring, summer; 
3 images in total)
1–4 Imaging ordered, purchased
Landsat ETM+, Spot HRV or similar (preferably 
from winter, spring, summer; 3 images in total)
10–30 Purchased
ASAR or RadarSat (radar) (from all seasons and 
weather conditions, 10 to 15 images in total)
10–20 Imaging ordered, purchased
3D model with map and image data 1 Computed 
Table II. Proposed earth observation and associated data from the repository for the baseline.
Figure 2. A 3D reconstruction of a village in Karelia from 1930’s. http://www.vtt.fi/tte/projects/virike.
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that is used to make the principal reference data-
base. The created database is the reference with
which continuously collected data are being com-
pared.
2.2 Routine monitoring
The image for the regular monitoring includes
both optical and radar (SAR – Synthetic Aperture
Radar) imagery. The principal data for the moni-
toring has to be from radar instruments because
optical imagery cannot be acquired through clouds
or night time. However, optical and thermal im-
agery should be acquired whenever possible be-
cause exposure of bare soil, for instance, is easier
to detect with optical imagery than with the avail-
able radar imagery.
The area to be monitored monthly is suggested
to be the repository site and its neighborhood. The
limits of the area could be approximately five
kilometers from the border of the fence of the
repository. It is possible to make an intensive
image interpretation on the repository site and on
its immediate neighborhood. In the whole moni-
toring area of approximately one hundred square
kilometers pre-selected targets would be moni-
tored. Detailed analysis of the whole area is not
feasible because the searched change anomalies
are small and at least at the beginning the analy-
sis has to be based on manual image interpreta-
tion.
The image analysis is based on the detection of
changes. The easiest way to do change detection is
to overlay images from different dates and ana-
lyze change visually. Detection of changes whose
area is small requires accurate geometric correc-
tion of images. Different illumination conditions
cause a change effect that is similar to real
changes. With radar the shadow effect can be
controlled better when the images are ordered
from the same orbit of the satellite. However,
image acquisition always from the same direction
is also a problem because important objects may
be left in the radar shadow. The SAR images
should preferably be acquired from two opposite
directions (i.e. from descending and ascending
orbits).
The images to be compared can be either
original data or derived spectral features using
the principal component transformation or simi-
lar transformation or by computing ratios of suc-
cessive images, for instance. Transformations that
keep the physical spectral information are more
recommendable than those in which the reflected
or emitted signal cannot be recovered from the
transformed imagery. Therefore a straightforward
use of the principal component analysis is some-
what questionable.
Automatic change analysis methods have been
developed (e.g. Häme et al. 1998). Those methods
are effective with optical data that have a spatial
resolution of coarser than 10 meters. Automatic
change detection methods for the radar data are
in the research stage. Since the required monitor-
ing time is very long, to the indefinite future, it is
clear that the regular monitoring should be as
automatic as possible. However, interactive and
not fully automatic methods are proposed to start
with because the present automatic methods are
somewhat immature. The automatic change anal-
ysis could be done for the whole image and the
most critical targets would be inspected manually.
Even though SAR images can be acquired
through cloud the images are not weather-inde-
pendent particularly when shorter wavelength
SAR instruments are used (C band or 6 cm in
ASAR and RadarSat, X band or 3 cm in Terra-
SAR). Particularly a wet surface changes the
image considerably. Therefore the baseline data
base should include images representing different
environmental conditions. A new image is prima-
rily compared with the baseline image that has
been acquired during similar conditions. The pro-
posed main phases of the interactive change anal-
ysis are:
1. Do image geometric correction and radiometric
calibration;
2. Search reference image from baseline database
that has been acquired during similar seasonal
and weather conditions to the image to be
analyzed;
3. Compute (automatically) two-temporal spec-
tral feature that highlights change;
4. Analyze change visually;
5. If anomalies detected locate them to 3D base-
line database, decide whether launch alarm
procedures;
6. Store analysis results and change image to
database.
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2.3 Alarm survey
When the routine monitoring reveals suspicious
change anomalies it can launch a specific alarm
survey. For this purpose airborne techniques us-
ing either manned or unmanned aircraft would be
the principal data collection tool in earth observa-
tion domain. Space-borne imaging is not the pri-
mary tool because of slow data acquisition proce-
dure and rather low spatial resolution with pres-
ently available SAR instruments. The situation
may favor more space-borne SAR imaging when
RadarSat 2 data, TerraSAR data, possibly also Ra-
darSat 3 and COSMO data with few meters reso-
lution will become available during the latter part
of this decade. Rapid acquisition of airborne re-
mote sensing data requires also preliminarily
agreed procedures with the data suppliers.
It is certain that the suspicious change anoma-
lies are not exclusively or even primarily checked
using remote sensing techniques. The anomalies
should be checked against other monitoring data
and inspected manually on ground.
The repetition cycle of the routine monitoring
is so slow that it is possible that the alarm comes
from other sources than from remote sensing data
analysis. A surface anomaly can remain undetec-
ted in change analysis. In such case the alarm
survey can be launched in the same manner as if
the alarm were originated from the analysis of
earth observation data.
2.4 Specific issues concerning Olkiluoto
Monitoring a repository that is located in north-
ern latitudes has some specific requirements. The
location of the Olkiluoto brings some own charac-
teristics to the monitoring procedure (Figure 3,
Figure 4). The very frequent cloud cover in Fin-
land emphasizes the significance of SAR imagery,
as does the long dark winter period. The seasonal
changes with wintertime snow-cover are signifi-
cant. The special features are taken into consider-
ation by selecting images from different seasons
and weather conditions in the baseline data set.
Snow changes its spectral properties greatly in
the optical and microwave spectral range when
the moisture changes making image analysis
more difficult. A special problem is autumn and
spring when the ground is partly covered by snow.
The site and its surroundings are partly forested,
which restricts detection of changes on ground.
Seaside location requires monitoring the sea traf-
fic and particularly following activities in nearby
islands. Despite the special features that have to
be taken into consideration the proposed approach
for the monitoring of the repository site should
however be rather universal.
The baseline data should be collected before
the excavation activities are started, i.e. in the
near future.
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Figure 3. Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and future repository area. Left: regular map; Right: Aster satellite
image August 6, 2002, red visible band, resolution 15 m.
Figure 4. Left: Thermal imagery from Olkiluoto (relative rainbow scale from coolest to warmest blue, green,
yellow, red); Right: Thermal imagery combined with red visible band. Aster satellite image August 6, 2002.
Thermal band resolution 90 m, red band resolution 15 m.
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Object Optical Thermal Microwave (SAR)
Building 3 (2 to 5 depending on 
color, background and 
cover)
3 (5 if heat emitting) 4 (5 if metal roof; 
orientation affects)
Road 4 (2 to 5 depending on 
color, background and 
cover)
3 (2 to 5 depending on 
weather conditions)
3 (2 to 4 depending on 
cover, material, 
seasonal and weather 
conditions)
Vehicle 3 (2 to 5 depending on 
color, background and 
cover)
4 (2 to 5 depending on 
temperature, 
background and cover)
5 (3 to 5 depending on 
cover, orientation)
Vegetation/
non vegetation
5 4 (depending on 
weather conditions)
3 (depending on 
surface roughness)
Vegetation biomass 5 4 4
* From highest to lowest: 5…1 (0 would be non-existing)
One of the principal benefits of remote sensing
data is that the site can be repeatedly document-
ed with 100 percent area coverage. When the im-
ages are stored in a database the analyses can be
redone at any moment. A large region can be mon-
itored quickly with a standardized procedure. The
proposed area to be monitored monthly is approxi-
mately 100 km2. The observation direction from
above is beneficial because the resolution of the
observation is very similar at all parts of the area
to be monitored and because the topographic vari-
ation normally does not prevent collecting obser-
vations.
The potential of different sensor types is hard
to evaluate in a universally applicable manner.
For instance, if SAR data acquisition can be opti-
mized (the incidence angle, the frequency and
spatial resolution) its potential with all listed
objects in Table III can be very high. Therefore the
ranking of the potential should be considered only
very indicative. The spatial resolution of present
and near-future non-military space-borne SAR
sensors is weaker than that of the optical sensors.
Also the inherent noise in SAR images, the speck-
le, reduces the effective resolution.
Removal of vegetation and exposure of bare
soil can be detected particularly well using optical
data. Thermal anomalies are certainly detectable
using thermal data. The metallic objects are strik-
ing in SAR imagery. Optical data including ther-
mal data cannot be acquired through cloud and
reflected optical data requires daytime acquisi-
tion. The optical data can be collected from below
clouds using a manned or unmanned aircraft if
financial resources are adequate. However, be-
cause of all-weather capability the SAR is sug-
gested as the principal imagery type in monitor-
ing.
Earth observation instruments can not nor-
mally acquire data from below ground surface.
With radar instruments information from the
depth of few centimeters can be acquired. Some
specific radar instruments have been developed
that can reveal metallic objects and constructions
3 Potential of remote sensing
Table III. Potential* of optical, thermal and microwave remote sensing to detect some objects.
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from the depth of few meters. These instruments
are only for airborne data acquisition. The near-
future SAR instruments with few meters resolu-
tion have the high frequency X band or C band. At
this frequency range vegetation effectively atten-
uates the back-scattered microwave signal. Thus
objects that are under the forest canopy cannot be
easily detected. An exception is metallic objects
that are so effective scatterers that they can be
detected also in the case when they are covered by
trees.
With optical data only limited information can
be obtained from below the canopy. However, in
Finland the tree cover is usually so sparse that
the canopy is not fully closed, which makes infor-
mation acquisition easier. Airborne laser scanning
is an option to collect accurate data from the
surface. Although the canopy attenuates also the
laser pulse the high resolution – some centimeters
at best – of the scanning makes it possible to
obtain information through small openings in the
canopy. Laser scanning is presently very costly
and restricted only to airborne data acquisition.
Laser data can be seen as augmenting data source
because it mainly gives the profile of the target
but does not describe its spectral properties.
As can be seen in the tables in Annex 1,
already now optical space-borne imagery with
one-meter (or sub-meter) resolution are available.
The highest spatial resolution of space-borne SAR
instrument is presently approximately ten me-
ters. RadarSat 2, to be launched in 2003 will have
a three-meter resolution. The resolution of the
TerraSAR instrument of Astrium (planned launch
in 2005) is as high as one-meter at its best.
Private companies control the space-borne re-
mote sensing instruments that have the highest
spatial resolution. In practice governments have
funded the development work and have a control
in data acquisition. Fortunately there are several
image suppliers, which reduces the risk for not
getting imagery. Airborne remote sensing can be
locally controlled, can provide higher spatial accu-
racy and is less weather dependent than the
space-borne observation. Instrument operator can
also modify the imagery. Therefore imagery from
different suppliers and instruments is needed to
minimize risk for data manipulation.
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Rough cost estimates to establish and run the
monitoring system are given in Table IV and Ta-
ble V. The system is assumed to run on a regular
PC that has large disk storage. The commercial
software consists of a GIS (Geographic Informa-
tion System) software and a database software.
The image analysis software is developed specifi-
cally for the repository site monitoring applica-
tion. This is the largest cost item in the system
establishment. It would be possible to start moni-
toring work using standard image processing soft-
ware and save costs in system establishment
phase. However this alternative would only be ap-
plicable when the work was done by remote sens-
ing experts. Longer-term operation will require
anyway specific system development to flexibly
handle the vast data storage.
The main costs to operatively run the monitor-
ing system come from the data costs. They may be
somewhat overestimated in Table V because com-
petition will decrease prices in the future. It is
assumed that one SAR image is bought every
month and the optical images every second or
third month. The two-day monthly work assumes
that the monitoring is done interactively by an
experienced image analyst. When the monitoring
system is started the amount of work to do the
inspection and system enhancements require sig-
nificant investment. The costs during the first
year after the system has been established could
be one half of the building costs.
4 Costs
Table IV. Estimated costs to establish the monitoring
system with the baseline data.
Table V. Estimated monthly costs to run routine
monitoring.
Cost item 1000 €
Hardware, software development
• PC w. large hard disk and writable DVD 10
• Image analysis system development 200
• GIS software 6
• Database software 3
• Interface with other safeguards data 15
Baseline space-borne imagery
• Radarsat fine beam (5 images) or ASAR 18
• Ikonos or QuickBird panchromatic 
(3 images)
8
• Ikonos or QuickBird multi-spectral 
(3 images)
8
• Landsat ETM+ (3 images) 2
Baseline airborne imagery 
• Digital aerial images 12
• Laser scanning (optional) 60
• Digital elevation model (existing) 2
Total costs 344
Cost item 1000 €
Space-borne imagery
• radarsat fine beam (1 image) or ASAR 3
• Ikonos or QuickBird panchro (0.3 images) 0.75
• Ikonos or QuickBird multispec 
(0.3 images)
0.75
• Landsat ETM+ (0.5 images) 0.3
Work two days 1.5
Total monthly costs 6.3
Total annual costs 75.6
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Earth observation techniques can be used to mon-
itor the repository site and its neighboring areas.
The main approach is suggested to be space-borne
remote sensing with SAR images because of all-
weather capability. The monthly SAR image anal-
ysis is augmented using high-resolution optical
data that are acquired whenever weather permits.
Present SAR images have too low spatial resolu-
tion to detect and analyze small targets but this
limitation should become less serious in few years,
particularly after the launch of the TerraSAR.
However, it is unclear, whether the distribution of
SAR images with highest resolution will be some-
how restricted.
The potential of earth observation was consid-
ered highest to detect undeclared construction of
buildings, roads, and quarries. Vehicles can be
also detected using earth observation, but real
traffic monitoring would require very frequent
observations, which is both impractical and costly.
Ship traffic can be monitored relatively well using
space-borne instruments if this is considered
worth of high image costs. Space-borne remote
sensing was selected as the principal earth obser-
vation method because continuous monitoring is
not feasible using airborne remote sensing, either.
For the baseline airborne imagery should be
acquired to assure highest possible accuracy. The
baseline data should be collected before excava-
tion activities start at the repository. Airborne
campaigns could be continued at regular inter-
vals, e.g. every second year to update the detailed
reference data sets.
The proposed monitoring method is interactive
image interpretation because automatic methods
were not considered reliable enough. This method
is not only expensive but it may have a security
risk. It is very unlikely that some illegal activities
could have found. When the inspection continues
for years the concentration of the image analyst
may weaken. Therefore research should be contin-
ued to further develop automatic change detection
methods that could replace the interactive ap-
proaches. There should be always a possibility for
manual image analysis. For instance it is hard to
imagine an automatic image interpretation meth-
od that would reliably work springtime when
partly snow-less ground has been exposed.
The earth observation monitoring system
should be combined with other monitoring tech-
niques such as the seismic monitoring.
5 Conclusions
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ANNEX 1 SELECTION OF PRESENT AND NEAR FUTURE INSTRUMENTS
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($/km²)
PAN (IKONOS) Space 
Imaging Ltd.
1999– 1 1 0.45…0.90 11 1–3 11×11 25
MS (IKONOS) Space 
Imaging Ltd.
1999– 4 4 0.45…0.53
0.52…0.61
0.77…0.88
0.64…0.72
11 1–3 11×11 18
QuickBird 
(QuickBird-2)
DigitalGlobe, 
USA
2001– 0.6/3 5 0.45…0.90 0.45…0.52 
0.52…0.60 
0.63…0.69 
0.76…0.90
11 16.5 22
ETM+ PAN 
(Landsat-7)
NASA, USA 1999– 15 1 0.52…0.90 8 16 185×185 0.02…0.04
ETM+ 
(Landsat-7)
NASA, USA 1999– 30
60 (IR)
7 0.45…0.52
0.52…0.60
0.63…0.69
0.75…0.90
1.55…1.75
2.09…2.35
10.4…12.5
8 16 185×185 0.02…0.04
HRVIR 
(SPOT-4)
CNES, France 1998– 10/20 4 0.50…0.59
0.61…0.68
0.79…0.89
1.58…1.75
2–3 60×60 or 
60×120
0.3…0.5
HRG 
(SPOT-5)
CNES, France 2002– 2.5/5/
10/20
5 0.49…0.69
0.50…0.59
0.61…0.68
0.78…0.89
1.58…1.75
2–3 60×60 or 
60×120
1…2
ASTER (Terra/
EOS AM-1)
NASA, USA 2000– 15/30/
90
14 0.52…0.60
0.63…0.69
0.76…0.86
1.60…1.70
2.15…2.19
2.19…2.23
2.24…2.29
2.30…2.37
2.36…2.43
8.13-11.65
(4 bands)
8/8/12 2–3 (?) 60 FREE
AVNIR-2 
(ALOS)
NASDA, 
Japan
2004 10 4 0.42…0.50
0.52…0.60
0.61…0.69
0.76…0.89
8 70 N/A
USE OF SATELLITE AND AIRBORNE REMOTE SENSING IN THE SAFEGUARDS… S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 9 9
B-17
Sensor (Satellite) Owner 
A
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
ye
ar
s
Sp
at
ia
l r
es
ol
ut
io
n 
(m
)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y/
Ba
nd
Po
la
riz
at
io
n
Op
er
at
in
g 
m
od
es
Sw
at
h 
w
id
th
 (k
m
)
ASAR (Envisat-1) ESA, EU 2002– 13…1000 5.3 
GHz/
C-band
HH, HV, 
VV, VH
(not fully 
polarimetric)
1) Image mode
2) Wave mode
3) Wide swath mode
4) Global monitor. mode
5) Alt. polariz. mode
1) 100
2) 5
3) 400
4) 400
5) 100
RadarSat 1 RadarSat 1995– 10…100 C-band HH
TERRASAR-X1 Astrium 2005– 1…30 (?) 10 GHz/
X-band
HH or VV 1) Spotlight
2) Stripmap
3) ScanSAR
4) Beam Steering
1) 10
2) 60
3) 200
4)
Radarsat-2 CSA/
MacDonald 
Dettwiler, 
Canada
2004– 3…100 5.4 
GHz/
C-band
HH, 
HV, 
VV, 
VH
1) Standard/Wide Swath
2) Polarimetric
3) Fine
4) ScanSAR
1) 170
2) 25
3) 25…50
4) 530
PALSAR (ALOS) Nasda, Japan 2004– 7…100 1.27 
GHz/
C-band
HH, 
HV, 
VV, 
VH
1) Fine
2) ScanSAR
3) Polarimetric
1) 70
2) 350
3) 65
TERRASAR-L1 Infoterra, 
UK/Germany
? 1…30 (?) 1.3 
GHz/
L-band
Full 
polarization
1) Spotlight
2) Stripmap
3) ScanSAR
4) Beam Steering
1) 10
2) 60
3) 200
4)
COSMO SkyMed Agenzia 
Spatiale 
Italiana
2005– 1… 10 GHz/
X-band
N/A Several 10…200
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This report describes briefly the scheme of
Olkiluoto geological repository for spent nuclear
fuel and provides background information of pos-
sible areas of diversion. The routes for unauthor-
ized diversion of nuclear material are discussed.
The handling and disposal of spent nuclear fuel
are shortly described and opportunities for unau-
thorized diversion in different stage of the process
are summarized.
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this report is to describe
possible methods for the detection of unauthor-
ized diversion by using environmental monitoring
of the repository. The isotopic signatures that may
be present are discussed and possible analytical
techniques monitoring these signatures are de-
scribed. The report is based on the reports of
SAGOR program.
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2.1 Repository concept
A repository for spent fuel in Finland will be built
in Olkiluoto. The geological media will be stable,
crystalline rock in the depth of 400–700 m, which
can provide a long-term isolation of spent nuclear
fuel from the biosphere. The research phase lasts
till 2010 and the building of the repository will
start after 2010. The operational phase may last
up to 70–80 years starting by 2020.
The repository, according to the Posiva concept,
will contain the encapsulation plant on surface
with stores for spent fuel and bentonite and equip-
ment needed for untreated water and waste water
treatment [1]
The underground areas contain following
rooms:
1. disposal tunnels on a single or various levels
2. access tunnels
3. shaft or/and ramp for transportation of con-
tainers
4. shaft for personnel and equipment transport
5. ventilation shaft
6. support facilities on surface and underground
The disposal rooms are arranged in panels with
joint access tunnels, and containers are disposed
in boreholes in the floor.
2.2 Spent fuel conditioning and
characteristics
The encapsulation plant in Olkiluoto will receive
and handle casks of Loviisa and Olkiluoto power
plants. The casks may contain intact fuel assem-
blies, defective assemblies and damaged spent fuel
rods. According to the Posiva concept the spent
fuel is unloaded from the cask in the hot cell of the
encapsulation plant. In the Loviisa cask the
number of fuel assemblies is 30, each having 214
kg of fuel. The amount of fuel in a cask is 6400 kg.
Castor TVO has 48 assemblies, 297 kg of fuel in
each. Total amount of fuel in a cask is 14300 kg.
In the encapsulation plant the fuel assemblies
are moved into the repository canisters, twelve
assemblies in each. Pu content of a canister will
be 14 kg in those of VVER fuel and 20 kg in BWR
fuel canisters [2]. The mass of Pu in one canister
is above a significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear
material, the approximate quantity of nuclear
material where possibility of manufacturing a
nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. For
Pu SQ is 8 kg total element.
2.3 Spent fuel containers
The repository canisters of spent fuel in Olkiluoto
Repository are planned to contain an inner canis-
ter of steel or iron and an outer canister made of
oxygen free copper alloyed with 40–60 ppm phos-
phorus [1]. The inner canister is prepared by cast-
ing and the channels for the assemblies are
formed casting by using a cast mould made of
steel. The outer copper canister is a 50 mm thick,
straight cylinder. The steel canister lid is closed
with a gasket and a bolted joint. The copper canis-
ter lid is fixed by electron beam welding. Twelve
fuel assemblies will be installed in one canister.
2 Repository description
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Possible diversion scenarios are analysed in
SAGOR program [3]. Potential diversions identi-
fied include diversion of a full cask, a full contain-
er, single spent fuel assemblies or rods. In this
report the most likely scenario was found to be the
diversion of a full cask or canister. There are sev-
eral locations in the fuel handling process from
which the diversion could take place. This may
take place during transportation, temporary stor-
ing, conditioning or after emplacement in the re-
pository. The easiest diversion scenarios may be
above ground, but they may be difficult to conceal.
The spent fuel could be used in a clandestine
reprocessing facility to manufacture a nuclear
explosive device. The diversion would be con-
cealed by falsification of records and reports, de-
feat in containment and surveillance, and replace-
ment of nuclear material with dummy material.
The first opportunity for diversion would be in
conditioning facility where containment will be
opened and there is easy access to the fuel. The on
site conditioning facility make it easier to divert
spent fuel, since background radiation levels
would be expected to be higher than if the condi-
tioning facility would be further away of the
facility.
A similar scenario exists when the container is
in the buffer storage or in the emplacement, and
the emplacement room has not been sealed. This
scenario would require a temporary or undeclared
hot cell facility, retrieved container facility, or
mobile containment vessel. If the spent fuel is
reprocessed in place, volatile gas and contamina-
tion control would be needed to hide the activities.
The diversion methods may change once the
container has been emplaced in the facility. The
containment can be moved to the surface to an
adjacent mine to have the contents removed and
processed. If the material is processed in the
underground facility, the plutonium would be di-
verted or transported to the surface with disposal
of waste materials.
3 Possible diversion scenarios
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Radionuclide Half life (years)
3H 12.3
14C 5.7·103
60Co 5.2
85Kr 10.7
125Sb 2.8
129I 1.6·107
137Cs 30.2
155Eu 4.7
234U 2.5·105
235U 7·108
236U 2.3·107
238U 4.5·109
237Np, 233Pa 2.1·106, 27 d
238Pu 87.8
239Pu 2.4·104
240Pu 6.6·103
241Am 437.2
4.1 Identification of signatures
The repository will require monitoring during op-
eration along with the inspections. The main pur-
pose of this report is to show whether there are
signatures that are detectable to indicate that di-
version activity is in progress or has taken place
in a repository. In a LA report from 1997, possible
isotopic signatures and monitoring these are thor-
oughly discussed [4]. The radionuclides measura-
ble with moderate resources are presented in Ta-
bles I–III. The pure ²-emitters and nuclides decay-
ing by electron capture or internal transition are
not included in this list because of expensive and
complicated analysis. Several other nuclides are
also excluded if the same information is possible
to obtain from a more abundant nuclide of same
element, or is in the natural decay series.
The isotopes listed in Tables I–III are those
present in greatest abundance or the most likely
ones to escape when opening the storage cask or
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.
4.2 Background considerations
There are several ways of monitoring the diver-
sion of nuclear material from a repository. Before
any of these technologies may be implemented,
the background concentrations of the nuclides
should be considered. A reason for background
concentrations of the signature nuclides is the glo-
bal fallout and another one is the repository and
its environment. A nuclear reactor and condition-
ing facility may increase the background in the
area. The impact of these facilities on the back-
ground levels of radioactive signatures may be
difficult to predict reliably. Therefore, the impact
should be experimentally determined before the
monitoring protocols are produced.
The global fallout caused by atmospheric tests
of nuclear explosives are the main source of global
fallout (Table IV). Same radionuclides are formed
4 Repository monitoring
Table I. Suggested list of radionuclides to be
measured after 20 years [4].
in nuclear reactors. The global fallout is a compli-
cated mixture whose composition is influenced by
the type of device tested, location of test, the
mechanism of atmospheric transportation and the
diffusion process coupled with various fractiona-
tion processes. Fractionation processes are possi-
ble also after deposition of thematerial on the
surface of the earth. The radionuclides may also
fractionate during biological uptake.
Global fallout contains many of the same radi-
onuclides that are in the spent fuel elements to be
stored in repository. It is not homogeneously de-
posited on the earth and may have undergone
additional fractionation by geochemical or biologi-
cal processes. Therefore it is necessary to charac-
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Radionuclide Half life (years)
14C 5.7·103
36Cl 3·105
90Sr 29.1
99Tc 2.1·105
129I 1.6·107
137Cs 30.2
237Np 2.1·106
238Pu 87.8
239Pu 2.4·104
240Pu 6.6·103
241Pu 14.4
242Pu 3.8·106
241Am 437.2
Radionuclide Half life (years)
14C 5.7·103
129I 1.6·107
234U 2.5·105
235U 7·108
236U 2.3·107
238U 4.5·109
237Np, 233Pa 2.1·106, 27 d
239Pu 2.4·104
240Pu 6.6·103
241Am 437.2
Radionuclide Half life (years)
3H 12.3
14C 5.7·103
85Kr 10.7
129I 1.6·107
137Cs 30.2
234U 2.5·105
235U 7·108
236U 2.3·107
238U 4.5·109
237Np, 233Pa 2.1·106, 27 d
238Pu 87.8
239Pu 2.4·104
240Pu 6.6·103
241Am 437.2
the technology used will affect the signature. Air
emissions can be reduced by installation of HEPA
filters and noble gas emissions by cryogenic scrub-
bing techniques. Aqueous emissions are possible
to reduce by processing the effluent waters by
flocculation or passing the waters through ion
exchangers.
In cask opening in an underground facility 85Kr
is the signature that might be detectable. In
facilities where damaged fuel elements are han-
dled, background may be too high for detecting
cask opening.
During reprocessing volatile radioactive gases
3H, 14C, 85Kr are released completely and also 129I
will be released if it is not recovered separately.
The detection of these signatures is more likely to
occur than in the case of cask opening and moving
the fuel to another location.
4.3 Monitoring techniques
Repository monitoring techniques are either di-
rect measurements for prompt detection of releas-
es that indicate diversion, or off-line monitoring
where samples are collected at the repository and
analysed at a laboratory. The problem with on–
line monitoring is that volatile signatures may
not exist. They have the advantage of fast re-
sponse, but the detection limits are higher com-
pared to laboratory techniques.
Table II. Suggested list of radionuclides to be
measured after 100 years [4].
Table III. Suggested list of radionuclides to be
measured after 1000 years [4].
Table IV. Global fallout radionuclides in
environmental samples.
terize the global fallout in the repository area by
environmental sampling before the fuel transpor-
tation to the facility will start.
The magnitude of the signatures from activi-
ties in the repository is much smaller than signa-
tures from an operating reprocessing facility and
function of activities performed at the repository.
The signal from the cask opening and removing
spent nuclear fuel for diversion to another loca-
tion will produce much smaller signature than
reprocessing the spent fuel in the repository. Also
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There are three volatile nuclides that may be
released when a storage cask or capsule is opened
for diversion or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel
and could be useful in on line monitoring of
radioactivity in a repository, namely 3H, 85Kr and
129I. These are all radioactive nuclides and may be
detected by using radiation measurements. The
isotopic composition of Xe could be an indicator of
cask opening, but they are stable isotopes and
mass spectrometric instruments are still difficult
to use for on line measurements. Several impor-
tant nuclides, e.g. uranium and plutonium may be
released as particles to the environment. For ana-
lysing those signatures samples should be collect-
ed and analysed at a laboratory.
4.3.1 On-line measurements of
volatile nuclides
There is a rather widespread variety of instru-
ments for tritium detection. Tritium can exist in
the form of tritiated hydrogen or as tritiated wa-
ter. Either form of tritium present is a signature
of cask opening. Gas filled detectors and scintilla-
tion detection are used for tritium detection. Back-
ground detection is important, because 222Rn may
increase the level of radiation underground when
ionisation chamber based tritium monitors are
used. The situation is the same with the low back-
ground liquid scintillation counter. With flow-
through proportional counters tritium activity can
be measured separately from other radioactive
gases. The detection limit for tritium in air can be
< 104Bq/m3 [5]. Proportional counters have also
been used for 85Kr detection [6]. Liquid scintilla-
tion counters are in many ways more difficult to
use on-line. Tritium analysis by collecting tritium
in water near the casks and analysis of samples in
the laboratory may offer detection limits near
background levels.
For the detection of 85Kr in environmental
samples several commercial detectors are availa-
ble [7]. A double window pancake-type Geiger-
Mqller tube had a sensitivity of 900 Bq/m3. For 129I
detection an instrument using a sodium iodide
scintillation detector has been reported [8].
4.3.2 Off-line methods
The detection limits for off-line analysis are gen-
erally lower than in on-line measurements. They
are not suitable when early warning is needed,
but offer a wide variety of signatures and greater
reliability. Their use will be effective during the
time when the repository is still open and it is
possible to get underground samples. The sam-
pling is more complicated after closing the reposi-
tory as shafts and ramps will be closed.
When off-line measurements of the samples is
used, the samples may be treated conventionally,
and a majority of the analytical methods will be
available; all radiochemical methods can now be
used effectively. Electron microscopy, electron mi-
croprobe, all mass spectrometry methods and
many other techniques can be used for analysis of
collected samples. By a combination of liquid
scintillation counting, high-resolution gamma
spectrometry, alfa-spectrometry and mass-spec-
trometry, all important radiochemical signatures
can be detected. Although analytical methods are
developed, sample collection and handling are
important factors in the reliability of the results.
Analysis of air and soil samples near a repository
for key signatures in conjunction with global fall-
out data and background data has the potential to
detect unauthorised diversion of spent nuclear
fuel. Methodologies for in-situ repository need to
be tested and sampling methods for off-line labo-
ratory analysis need to be developed. Also, the
development of new analytical methods needs to
be taken into account and new instruments tested
for evaluation of their capabilities for repository
monitoring.
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Global fallout containing many of the radionu-
clides that are present in the spent fuel is limiting
the capabilities to detect the signatures from un-
authorised diversion of spent nuclear fuel. Fallout
is not homogenous and has undergone fractiona-
tion by geochemical and biological processes.
Therefore it is necessary to characterise the local
situation at the repository before the first ship-
ments of spent fuel. These background levels need
to be taken into consideration in the development
of Quality Control program for monitoring. A nu-
clear reactor near the repository may be an addi-
tional source of signature nuclides. The impact on
the environment is difficult to predict.
The magnitude of the signature is a function of
5 Conclusions and recommendations
the activities performed in the facility. The cask
opening produces a much smaller signature than
reprocessing the spent fuel within the facility
either one being much smaller than the signature
produced by a reprocessing facility. Emissions can
also be reduced when suitable techniques for
cleaning the air and water releases are used.
The on-line detectors for repository monitoring
need long-term testing. The stability and reliabili-
ty and the incidence of false negative or positive
responses are the main concerns. Sample collec-
tion methods and sample integrity maintenance
are important factors in the reliability of the off
line analysis of signatures.
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The purpose of this work is to describe and define the benefits and drawback of the
geophysical monitoring methods which can be utilized in the monitoring of nuclear waste
repositories. The work concentrates on seismological tools only, and does not deal with any
other geophysical methods which can be taken into consideration.
The study was done by using the comprehensive seismic database of seismic events
occurred in Fennoscandia and adjacent areas compiled by the Institute of Seismology. On
line data from the Finnish national seismograph network station VAF is used to show the
weekly and diurnal noise level variations. The station locates 200 kilometres from
Olkiluoto area, and per se cannot present exactly the background noise at the repository
site, but only shows the behaviour of seismic background noise, in general.
Benefits and drawbacks of the seismic methods are discussed as well as future
approaches of the seismic methods.
Abstract
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Seismic methods are efficient in different kind of
monitoring tasks. They were utilized since late
1950’s in monitoring underground nuclear explo-
sions, and event before that during the World War
II its chances to forecast weather in northern Eu-
rope were evaluated.
Seismological methods cover from noise stud-
ies up to the final estimation of the possible
source parameters, and powers causing the phe-
nomena. In this work the main interest is to
formulate the environmental parameters which
most comprehensively define the seismic charac-
teristics of the repository site before, during and
after excavation works.
In the first stage the pre-excavation temporal
noise and seismic patterns are described, and as
the works begin, the active period patterns are
formed. These noise and seismicity patterns are
then updated in the run of time to keep the
“ONKALO” as intact as possible.
This paper presents the registration and anal-
ysis of data which are available from the record-
ings of the Finnish national seismological net-
work, operated by the Institute of Seismology.
Registrations and data are from years 2000–2001,
and corresponding seismic bulletins.
1 Introduction
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In the seismic monitoring the background noise
plays a significant role. The noise can be so strong
and has high amplitudes that it veils true seismic
signals totally. Seismic background noise exists at
all frequencies of seismic registration. Sources of
long-period noise are meteorological situations
over great sea areas. The behaviour of this noise is
similar when registered simultaneously at sites
near the coast and sites which lie far away from
coastal zones.
The sources of short-period noise are natural
and artificial. Artificial noise is due to traffic,
industry e.g. saw mills, power plants and other
hammering machinery. Also, any other human
activity affects the background noise. The main
sources of natural short-period noise are small sea
and lake area. Also, the influence of winds against
buildings, on the topography and the registration
system itself, should be taken into account. Fur-
ther there are noise sources which are non-seis-
mic in nature, such as signal generated noise.
The main purpose of the noise study in this
work is to show that simply monitoring the diur-
nal noise, and showing how the activity in the
repository site can be monitored. So, any bias to
normal noise pattern may lead to recovery any
anomaly in the repository geology or its vicinity.
Figure 1 shows clearly the weekly noise behav-
iour at the Finnish national seismograph station
VAF which locates at the Ylistaro municipality
approximately 200 kilometres from Olkiluoto re-
pository site. The station itself is part of the
Finnish national seismic network, and is used for
monitoring the seismic activity in the Bothnian
Bay areas. A new seismic station will be built in
Laitila in the near future, and that station is only
a few tens of kilometres from Olkiluoto, and as
such can be utilized to monitor Olkiluoto area and
2 Noise conditions
Figure 1. Virtual RMS noise level at seismograph station VAF in late October 2002. As one can see the diurnal
noise level follows the human (working hours) activity in the area. The changes in the noise level are striking
clear even though the station locates over 10 kilometres from a heavily used high way.
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to work as a geophysical consistency monitoring
tool along the microseismic array at the reposi-
tory site.
The working day and free day noise levels can
Figure 2. Noise level in dB’s (rel to nm²/Hz) on Monday 21st October 3.0–6.0 Hz. The noise level rose
approximately 16 dB for two hours around noon (UTC, early afternoon local time) that time of the day may
present the early afternoon activity in the vicinity of the station. Without any direction estimations the source
of this rise of noise level cannot be determined, but it can be connected to frequent or daily routines of
agricultural works in the village nearby. Rise in the noise level in the morning at 6 o’clock and later in the
afternoon around 14 can be connected to the travelling to and from jobs. Late evening and night changes in
the noise level cannot be connected anything else but heavy convoy traffic to and from the town Seinäjoki.
be seen in Figure 2 where the noise level at
frequencies from 3.5 to 6.0 Hz is shown. Even the
rise in the traffic can be seen during the rush hour
on Monday.
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Seismograph stations in Finland detect daily
many seismic events at regional distances
(∆<2000 km). Almost all of these events stem from
various kinds of explosions (Tarvainen and Huse-
bye 1993). Such explosion recordings are of little
scientific value, and add considerably the daily
analyst workload. In this work the aim is to track
the seismic activity near Olkiluoto repository site.
The first step is to describe the seismic activity in
the area. In Figure 3 there is shown the seismic
events near Olkiluoto in 2000–2001. Many of the
events near Olkiluoto stemmed from explosions
done during construction works in the port of Rau-
ma and two quarries in the vicinity. Some big
events located at Gulf of Bothnian are due to
3 Spatial seismic patterns in the area
depth charge explosions during naval training ac-
tions in the area. No earthquakes occurred in the
area in 2000 and 2001 when this statistics was
formed. From the point of view of monitoring the
repository site the continuous seismic monitoring
is essential. Any anomalies in the annual patterns
must be taken into detailed examination. This
does not mean only increased but also rapid
changes in seismic activity, in general. The biggest
problem to monitor human activity in the area is
possible spoiling or veiling seismic patterns by
activating some legal and announced activities
near illegal access points. Anyway this kind of
activities may be surveyed in many efficient ways.
Figure 3. Seismic events in western Finland in 2000–2001. The events near Olkiluoto stem mainly from
excavation works carried out in the port of Rauma and explosions in two quarries near Olkiluoto. The white
asterisk shows the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site.
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If seismic events have clear and repeating tempo-
ral pattern, they can be assumed to have same or
similar sources, such as frequently shooting mine
or quarry. As most of the events daily detected by
the Finnish seismograph stations stem from vari-
ous mines in the area, their shooting practice
should stay similar from year to year. One of the
best studied mine locates in the municipality of
Siilinjärvi in the central Finland. This phosphate
ore mine has very distinct shooting practice. The
explosions there are prominent—up to 75 metric
tons of TNT equivalent—and they are practically
always done 15 minutes to two P.M local time. The
4 Temporal patterns of Fennoscandian
seismicity
mine can simply be recognized from the close Nil-
siä mine only 20 kilometres apart by examining
the origin times of events, and also, the signal
characteristics which—in Siilinjärvi case—are
very strong P-phases. In Figure 4 there are shown
the temporal patterns of Siilinjärvi area in 2000
and 2001. The self-organizing pattern of temporal
and spatial patterns was studied by Tarvainen
(2002).
The temporal pattern of events in the Olkiluo-
to area shows nothing else but the working day
activity. All events concentrate on working days
and working hours only. This can be used to
Figure 4. Diurnal and weekly distributions of origin times of events in the Siilinjärvi area in 2000 and 2001.
The concentration of detections is around noon (UTC) the fact which is widely used in the source
identification. Late evening events on Tuesday (day number 2) and Friday (day number 5) might have origins
at road construction works in the nearby intra-national highway no. 5.
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monitor well the activity in the repository site.
Further, if any changes in these patterns occur
they can soon be detected. In Figure 5 there is
shown the weekly pattern of seismic activity in
the Olkiluoto area. That activity is even more
prominent and characteristic than the temporal
characteristics in Siilinjärvi.
Figure 5. Daily detection activity as registered in 2000 and 2001 within 100 kilometres from the Olkiluoto
repository site. Weekdays are from Monday (1) to Sunday (7). The highest activity of origin times seems to
concentrate in early afternoon hours of Tuesday. Another more active time is on Thursday, also in the
afternoon. White sliver-like concentrations on Saturday has no explanation.
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The seismic risk in the repository area is based on
the simulation of possible future earthquakes and
the seismic history in the site. The seismicity in
the area is dependent on several factors. One can
mention the post-glacial rebound, eastward ori-
ented ridgepush and postglacial faulting (Arvids-
son 1966). The design, constructing and monitor-
ing of the repository site requires estimation of
seismic risk that earthquakes in the run of thou-
sands of years may cause (Saari 2000). La Pointe
5 Seismic risk and hazard assessment
et al. (2002) and La Pointe and Hermanson (2002)
constructed scenario for the next 100000 years in
which the energy release and seismic risk within
100 kilometres from the repository site are simu-
lated. The bigger earthquakes, having local mag-
nitudes over 5.5, can be estimated to occur in the
area at the end of a simulation period. Still, these
estimations are very uncertain, as the post-glacial
rebound seismicity differs from the “normal” mag-
nitude-frequency distribution.
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The seismic monitoring can be adjusted to work in
the most efficient way to monitor any anomalies
in the seismic patterns. Transient changes in the
background noise or anomalous diurnal noise pat-
terns may reveal activities which are zealot, ille-
gal or hostile.
The seismic activity in the area is well moni-
tored by the Institute of Seismology, and also
some other Scandinavian authorities. Rapid or
unannounced changes in the seismic activity can
be considered unwanted access to the area, or
some works that do not belong to the repository
site surveillance nor its monitoring.
6 Benefits and drawbacks of
seismic methods in monitoring
the nuclear waste repository
As the long-term background noise is station-
ary, it is easy to follow its transient changes. Yet,
any illegal, activities can be tried to be veiled by
activating noise sources which prevail and mimic
natural sources. Anyway, modern pattern recogni-
tion methods may uncover the possible zealot
access, as the best polarization analysis tools can
be adjusted to certain point-like sources.
If trying to cover activities by using minor or
moderate ripple fired explosions can be utilized to
hide access to repository sites. Yet, this is a way
which can soon be recovered.
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In the first phase of the monitoring tasks the seis-
mological baseline in Olkiluoto area should be
formed. This can be done by using the present
microseismic array at the site. The annual and
diurnal noise behaviour should be determined. De-
termination of seismic activity in the area can be
done by utilizing the same microseismic array, or
the Finnish national seismological network, and
especially the new Laitila (RAF) seismograph sta-
7 Future plans
tion which will be built in 2003.
During the excavation works the seismic activ-
ity patterns are then compared with these pre-
excavation results, and a standard activity period
patterns are formed. In the final monitoring stage
these pre- and post-excavation patterns are used
to survey the activity in the repository area and in
“ONKALO”, as well.
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